Peace talks are on the brink of collapse: the agreement demands too much from the invaded and almost nothing from the aggressor.
In a few hours, this disastrous peace process sponsored by Trump may be history. If there was something that Ukraine had set as a red line from the beginning, it is precisely one of the seven points in the American proposal as an unnecessary sweetener to the Kremlin: the recognition of the Crimean peninsula as Russian territory.
It was unnecessary because of all the things that Vladimir Putin has demanded from the US in recent weeks, this issue seemed to worry him the least, but it is precisely the one that breaks the deal. There were alternatives pointed out by Ukraine that Volodymyr Zelensky could accept, such as the recognition de facto and the commitment to try to recover those territories through diplomatic means and not militarily. But the recognition de jure, that is, formal and legal recognition of Crimea as a Russian province with full legal effect, disrupts everything.
Faced with Zelensky’s refusal to accept a bad deal, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US negotiator Steve Witkoff left the London meeting at the last minute to pressure Kiev. Europe, represented there by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, backed Ukraine. Macron reiterated: “Europe will demand respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in any peace agreement.” The comment came after US Vice President Vance stated that both Ukraine and Russia would have to make territorial concessions.
The document presented to Ukraine and Russia offers tasty concessions to the aggressor and meager and indefinite countermeasures to the aggrieved by the Trump Administration, a buyer of most of the propaganda myths on which this invasion was paved.
Let’s first analyze the aspects that the document does define:
1.- The aforementioned recognition de jure of Russian control of Crimea by the United States.
2.- “Recognition de facto” of the Russian occupation of almost the entire Luhansk region and the occupied parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia.
3.- The promise (in writing) that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. The text states that Ukraine could become part of the European Union.
4.- The lifting of sanctions imposed since 2014.
5.- Increased economic cooperation with the United States.
For Ukraine, the first point is non-negotiable and does not consider the following points, which could be within the realm of possible agreement. Additionally, if the US recognizes Crimea de jure as Russian, it would be the first time since World War II and opens the door for others to use the invasion of sovereign territories to unilaterally annex regions in the future.
Now, let’s look at the issues that Ukraine supposedly gains:
1.- “A solid security guarantee” involving an ad hoc group of European countries and possibly non-European countries with similar ideas, but not the United States. This matter, which is existential for Kiev, is undeveloped.
2.- The return of the small part of the Kharkiv region occupied by Russia. It consists of two strips of devastated land near the cities of Kupiansk and Vovchansk, insignificant compared to what Ukraine gives up.
3.- Unhindered passage of the Dnipro River, a positive measure but one that seems insufficient.
4.- Compensation and assistance for reconstruction, although the document does not specify where the funds will come from, which is actually essential: who pays.
Additionally, it is established that the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, within the area occupied by the Russians, is considered Ukrainian territory but operated by the United States and supplies electricity to both Ukraine and Russia, which is difficult to reconcile. If it is Ukrainian, why would it power the Russian energy system? The document also refers to the agreement on raw materials between the United States and Ukraine, an increasingly predatory extortion of natural resources yet to be inventoried.
Another noteworthy aspect, following the negotiating style of the old USSR, is that Vladimir Putin no longer speaks in maximalist terms as at the beginning (such as demanding complete occupied provinces, in addition to the conquered areas), because that has allowed him to place the goal where he wanted, given the submission of US negotiators to his positions, achieved without Washington exerting any additional pressure such as sanctions.
Now he can secure a good deal that allows him to rearm for two or three years, without sanctions, to come back for more when he regains strength. A bad deal is always the seed of an even worse war. Yesterday Putin stated, “Russia needs to prepare for new wars and continue expanding military production.” The agreement is so bad that it does not even demand that Russia refrain from invading Ukraine again.
The Kremlin no longer demands Zelensky’s head as an “illegitimate” leader, but asserts that it is willing to negotiate “directly with the Ukrainian regime.” The arguments of “demilitarization” or “denazification” are also no longer heard, as they were merely propaganda for domestic consumption.
Putin faces two options: continue the war, encouraged by the turbo-patriots he has helped fuel, and thus achieve small advances on the Ukrainian fronts at increasingly higher costs, prolonging a war that he cannot militarily win as he conceived it, or freeze the conflict and try to dominate Ukraine in another way. Because that’s what it’s about, creating an unviable and precarious state to dominate. In this sense, Putin can achieve this by weakening Kiev as an independent political entity, and this agreement, which removes sanctions and allows him to take a breather, is a perfect tool.
Putin may accept this document unlike Zelensky or European leaders because it allows him to please Trump and hold on to conditions that may not be as favorable to his interests in the future. There is only one thing that would disturb the Kremlin in this scenario: European deployment as a peacekeeping force in Ukraine.
Moscow has insisted that the presence of these troops would be a trigger for a new war. As explained by Sam Greene, a Russia expert at King’s College London, “a European force must enter before or at the beginning of a ceasefire, but if the ceasefire occurs first, it is almost certain that a security force will not be deployed. For Europe, it’s now or never.” But Brussels’ timing always proves disappointing.
Timothy Snyder, a History professor at Yale, states that “returning to the pre-war status quo is not a very serious strategy.”
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Source: Ukraine will not cross its red line: Crimea officially Russian